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Modern Law of the Sea:  
From Governance to Privatization
Nathalie Ros?
 Modern Law of the Sea refers to the current International Law, 
stemming from UNCLOS and customary Internat ional Law, but 
apprehended within a diachronic perspective, in order to integrate new 
challenges and developments of the governance of oceans and seas, 
especially in the human, environmental, economic and geopolitical fields. 
Obviously the Modern Law of the Sea is still under construction, facing 
positive and negative trends, and evolving from the traditional legal 
framework to the need for new regimes. The danger is to jeopardize the 
fragile balance struck during the Third Conference1, but also to promote a 
shift from a traditional State-centric system to a transnational private-
oriented model.
 At the crossroads between governance2 and privatization3, private 
environmental governance is already a reality4. In the Modern Law of the 
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2 N. Ros, La gouvernance des mers et des océans, entre mythes et réalités 
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Sea, this trend does exist; it supersedes the historical dialectic Mare 
Liberum versus Mare Clausum, the traditional approach developed between 
maritime internationalism and national appropriation of the oceans and 
seas, together with the legal options of the 1982 Convention. Indeed, they 
are all forms of public appropriation, individually by the coastal State for 
the continental shelf 5 and exclusive economic zone6, or collectively in the 
example of the International Seabed Authority, an intergovernmental 
organization with a territorial jurisdiction over the Area7, or a non-
appropriation in the case of the high seas8, whereas the new paradigm 
4 R. Falkner, Private environmental governance and international relations: 
exploring the links, Global environmental politics 2003, 3 ?2?, p 72-87.
5 Article 77 Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf : “1. The coastal 
State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 2. The rights referred to in 
paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the 
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these 
activities without the express consent of the coastal State. 3. The rights of the coastal 
State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, 
or on any express proclamation. 4. The natural resources referred to in this Part 
consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil 
together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the 
seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or 
the subsoil ”.
6 Article 56 Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive 
economic zone: “1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: ?a? 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; ?b? jurisdiction as 
provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to: ? i? the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; ? ii? marine 
scientific research; ? iii? the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
?c? other rights and duties provided for in this Convention”.
7 Article 136 Common heritage of mankind: “The Area and its resources are the 
common heritage of mankind ”; and Article 157 Nature and fundamental principles 
of the Authority: “1. The Authority is the organization through which States Parties 
shall, in accordance with this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, 
particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area”.
8 Article 89 Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas: “No State may 
validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty ”.
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calls for private appropriations. This kind of danger had been identified by 
the negotiators and drafters of UNCLOS; it had been considered a 
sufficiently real threat, for Article 137?1 to condemn explicitly and 
prohibit private as well as public appropriations: “no State shall claim or 
exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its 
resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any 
part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor 
such appropriation shall be recognized ”.
 De facto, the current evolution mainly concerns the superjacent waters 
and the high seas; from governance to privatization, it is supposed to face a 
biodiversity protection challenge ?II?, but first of all it is justified as a 
fisheries management strategy ?I?.
I – A fisheries management strategy
 Obviously, the logic behind this kind of strategy is not new. Going 
back in the past, to the Proclamation issued by King James Stuart on 6 
May 16099, access to fishing fields ?B? and access to fishery resources ?A? 
already appear to be legally interrelated.
A – Access to fishery resources
 Indeed this historical proclamation is not only a claim over the seas 
surrounding the British Isles, and especially the North Sea, but also a way 
to assert exclusive fishing rights for British people, and exclude 
foreigners, and in particular Dutch fishermen10.
 This assertion is not very different from the current approach, 
developed from the sovereign rights of the coastal State ?1? to a market-
oriented approach of fishing rights ?2?.
9 J. F. Larkin & P. L. Hughes ?Eds.?, Stuart Royal Proclamations, Royal 
Proclamations of King James I 1603-1625, Volume 1, Oxford University Press 
1973, 98 By King James, A Proclamation touching Fishing, Westminster 6 May 
1609, p 217-219.
10 J. D. Benson, England, Holland, and the Fishing Wars, Philosophy Study, 
September 2015, Vol. 5, No. 9, p 447-452.
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1? From the sovereign rights of the coastal State
 Politico-economic claims, initiated immediately after the Second World 
War, are at the origins of the Exclusive Economic Zone ?a?, a major concept 
in the contemporary Law of the Sea, and the legal basis of an exclusive 
jurisdiction over conservation and management ?b? of the marine living 
resources now enjoyed by the coastal State.
a? At the origins of the Exclusive Economic Zone
 Following the Truman Proclamation on Fisheries dated 28 September 
194511, the appropriation trend originates first in the claims of South 
American States bordering the Pacific12 in order for their fishery sector to 
benefit the rich Humboldt Current, in 1947 and under the famous Santiago 
Declaration of 195213. They proclaimed initially their sovereignty or 
sovereign rights to a distance of 200 nautical miles, but it was a claim for 
economic sovereignty based on the doctrine of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources14; and the contribution of Latin-Americans15, 
especially with the Declaration of Santo Domingo of 197216 which 
11 H. S. Truman, Proclamation 2668 - Policy of the United States with Respect to 
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, September 28, 1945, Online 
by G. Peters & J. T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58816.
12 Chile, Peru, Ecuador; cf. H. Llanos Mansilla, Los países del sistema del Pacifico 
Sur ante la Convención sobre derecho del mar, Revista chilena de derecho 1983, 
p 21-38. 
13 Declaración sobre Zona Marítima, Santiago, 18 de agosto de 1952; http://
especiales.pulso.cl/LaHaya/resource/docs/Santiago1952.pdf.
14 Resolution 1803 ?XVII?, 14 December 1962, Permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/193/11/PDF/NR019311 .pdf?OpenElement; cf . N. Schrijver, 
Sovereignty over natural resources: Balancing rights and duties, Cambridge 
University Press 1997, especially Chapter 7 The Law of the Sea: Extension of 
Control over Marine Resources, p 202-230.
15 V. Marotta Rangel, O Novo Direito do Mar e a América Latina, V - O 
Alargamento da Jurisdição Horizontal do Estado Costeiro, Revista da Faculdade 
de Direito ?Universidade de São Paulo? 1981, p 75-85.
16 Declaración de Santo Domingo aprobada por la Reunión de Ministros de la 
Conferencia Especializada de los Países del Caribe sobre los Problemas del Mar 
?1972?; http://www.dipublico.org/10589/declaracion-de-santo-domingo-
aprobada-por-la-reunion-de-ministros-de-la-conferencia-especializada-de-los-
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articulated the notion of patrimonial sea, was supported by all the 
developing States, especially by the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee, with the Addis Ababa Declaration of 1973, and the final African 
proposition17. It is interesting to note that developed States were originally 
reluctant and even strongly opposed to this appropriation dynamic, before 
understanding it would also be of great benefit for them and finally 
supporting it, as the EEZ provides every coastal State with an exclusive 
jurisdiction over conservation and management and mutatis mutandis 
exclusive rights over fishing resources.
b? An exclusive jurisdiction over conservation and management
 As stated under Article 56 of UNCLOS, the coastal State does not have 
sovereign rights over the zone, but only sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources 
of the EEZ18. As regards fisheries, it enjoys an exclusive jurisdiction in 
terms of conservation ?Article 61? and exploitation ?Article 62?; it 
determines both the allowable catch of the living resources in its EEZ and 
its capacity to harvest them, and gives other States only access to the 
surplus, in the case it does not have the capacity to harvest the entire 
allowable catch. In other words, it can de facto exclude foreign fishermen, 
because the EEZ permits the national appropriation of halieutic resources 
and their exclusive exploitation via a licensing and quotas system. But this 
kind of regulation was proven in fact to be unable to prevent overexploitation, 
what is asserted to justify a shift to a market-oriented approach of fishing 
rights.
2? To a market-oriented approach of fishing rights
 The call for this evolution, towards a form of privatization, derives from 
a theoretical neoliberal postulate ?a? leading to individual transferable 
quotas ?ITQs? ?b?, proposed as the best solution to face overexploitation 
paises-del-caribe-sobre-los-problemas-del-mar-1972/.
17 A. Del Vecchio, Zona economica esclusiva e Stati costieri, Roma Le Monnier - 
Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali 1984, p 61-113.
18 F. Orrego Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone - Regime and Legal Nature 
under International Law, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative 
Law - New Series, Cambridge University Press 1989.
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challenges.
a? From a theoretical neoliberal postulate
 The postulate at the origins of the argumentation is economic and 
generally presented and explained as The Tragedy of the Commons, by 
reference to the title of the well-known article published by Garett Hardin 
in 196819. By analogy with herdsmen in a pasture open to all, Hardin 
demonstrates that each fisherman seeks to maximize his gain, taking 
advantage of the freedom of the seas and professing to believe in the 
inexhaustible resources of the oceans; then he concludes that privatization 
is the best choice. To face this challenge, Elinor Ostrom proposes an 
alternative, in 1990, Governing the Commons; it is the title of her book 
subtitled The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action20. She considers 
that privatization is not the only way, and promotes collective actions 
involving public and private actors, what refers to governance. 
 In the field of fisheries, one solution could be a responsible co-
management between the coastal State, legal ly in charge of the 
conservation of the resources in the EEZ, and national fishermen via a 
l icensing and quotas system. But taking into consideration that 
overexploitation still exists, neoliberal rhetoric considers that public action 
is inefficient and must be replaced by private initiative, and market-
oriented logic, the so-called invisible hand of the market, paving the way to 
individual transferable quotas ?ITQs?21.
b? To individual transferable quotas ?ITQs?
 From a global perspective, private environmental governance appears 
to be the consequence of the failure of the State system to govern the 
Commons, and the claim for a real privatization of the fishing rights 
directly proceeds from this kind of logic. 
19 G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 1968, Vol. 162, no. 3859, p 
1243-1248.
20 E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action, Cambridge University Press 1990.
21 N. Blanchet, Réflexions sur le mouvement de patrimonialisation des 
ressources halieutiques, Annuaire de Droit Maritime et Océanique 2004, Tome 
XXII, p 395-424.
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 Somehow quotas appear to be a form of appropriation, but it is still a 
public-driven appropriation: the coastal State fixes the quotas declined in 
licenses; the quota gives a right to fish and not directly a right on the fish22. 
Most of the time quotas are not directly transferable or they could be 
transferred but not on a market-oriented way; for example, in France 
quotas still remain non-transferable at least de jure, in the sense that they 
cannot be sold as such on a market23.
 But the system does exist in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and even in Europe, for example in UK, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, and 
Spain. Proposed to be the official management system pursuant to the new 
Common Fisheries Policy ?CFP?, this option received support from a lot of 
environmental NGOs, most of which are financed by the Charitable 
Trusts24, but finally it was not included as compulsory and remained an 
option under the European Union 2013 Regulation on the Common 
Fisheries Policy25, whose Article 21 states that “Member States may 
22 For a privatist analysis of these questions, cf. G. Proutière-Maulion, L’évolution 
de la nature juridique du poisson de mer. Contribution à la notion juridique de 
bien, Recueil Dalloz 2000, p 647-652; Essai sur la nature juridique du quota de 
pêche. Contribution à la notion juridique de bien, Annuaire de Droit Maritime et 
Océanique 2003, Tome XXI, p 307-323; and P. Chaumette & G. Proutière-
Maulion, Quota hopping et appropriation des ressources biologiques, Annuaire 
de Droit Maritime et Océanique 2005, Tome XXIII, p 309-318.
23 On the options for ITQs transposition in France, cf. R. Laulier, Vers une 
appréciation différentiée de la patrimonialisation des droits d’accès aux 
ressources halieutiques, Annuaire de Droit Maritime et Océanique 2010, Tome 
XXVIII, p 291-318; G. Buisson & M. Barnley, Les quotas individuels de pêche 
transférables. Bilan et perspectives pour une exploitation durable des 
ressources, Etudes et synthèses, Direction des études économiques et de l’
évaluation environnementale, Ministère de l’Ecologie, du Développement et de 
l’Aménagement durable 2007.
24 Cf. The very well documented report, Y. Giron & A. Le Sann, Blue Charity 
Business ? la réforme des pêches européennes ? premier panorama ? 2000 à 
2011 , Pêche et développement 2012; http://www.peche-dev.org/IMG/
pdf/121107_blue_charity_ business_full_report_fr.pdf.
25 Regulation ?EU? N? 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council 
Regulations ?EC? N? 1954/2003 and ?EC? N? 1224/2009 and repealing Council 
Regulations ?EC? N? 2371/2002 and ?EC? N? 639/2004 and Council Decision 
2004/585/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 28.12.2013, L 354/22-61; 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R138
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establish a system of transferable fishing concession”26.
 The experience shows that without correctives the individual 
transferable quotas system leads to the exclusion of small-scale artisanal 
fishermen and the concentration of fishing rights in favor of large industrial 
fishing. 
 But in the Modern Law of the Sea, access to fishing fields also 
constitutes a real challenge in terms of appropriation.
B – Access to fishing fields
 Indeed, new trends in maritime economy inevitably lead to competition 
between operators, and specifically between fishermen and private actors of 
fixed activities, looking for de facto appropriations ?1? of maritime spaces 
under public jurisdiction. But the development of MPAs ?2?, justified by 
environmental concerns, also involves risks of privatization.
1? De facto appropriations
 This current trend appears to be justified according to Blue Growth 
dynamics ?a?; it leads to confer to private operators exclusive rights over 
maritime spaces ?b?.
a? According to Blue Growth dynamics
 Interrelated with the Blue Economy, initiated by Gunter Pauli in 
200427, and developed in the framework of the EU Maritime Integrated 
Policy, the Blue Growth is first a European Union Strategy launched by the 
Commission in 201228; taking into consideration that seas and oceans are 
0&from=EN.
26 Article 21 Establishment of systems of transferable fishing concessions: “Member 
States may establish a system of transferable fishing concessions. Member States 
having such a system shall establish and maintain a register of transferable fishing 
concessions ”.
27 http://www.theblueeconomy.org/. G. Pauli, Blue Economy-10 Years, 100 
Innovations, 100 Million Jobs, Paradigm Publications 2010; and The Blue 
Economy 3.0: The marriage of science, innovation and entrepreneurship creates 
a new business model that transforms society, Xlibris 2017.
28 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, Blue Growth opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable 
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drivers for the European economy and have great potential for innovation 
and growth, it aims to support sustainable growth in the marine and 
maritime sectors as a whole. The strategy comprises the development of 
three dimensions: sectors that have a high potential for sustainable jobs 
and growth; essential components to provide knowledge, legal certainty 
and security in the blue economy; sea basin strategies to ensure tailor-
made measures and to foster cooperation between countries. The main 
Blue Growth focus areas are blue energy; aquaculture; maritime, coastal 
and cruise tourism; marine mineral resources; and blue biotechnologies29. 
The concept is widely accepted and transposed; it has been adopted by 
various countries, not only in Europe30 , and is also part of the UN 
framework, with the Blue Growth Initiative developed by the FAO31.
 Obviously, the Blue Growth philosophy assumes that public and 
private actors, coastal States and marine industries, shall interfere and 
collaborate; as such it involves a risk of appropriation32, especially in the 
form of exclusive rights over maritime spaces33. 
b? Exclusive rights over maritime spaces
 Indeed, the development of this Blue Economy generates competition 
for maritime space, first of all between fixed activities such as offshore 
growth ?Text with EEA relevance?, Brussels, 13.9.2012, COM ?2012? 494 final; 
https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/docs/body/
com_2012_494_en.pdf.
29 On associated challenges, cf. P. Ehlers, Blue growth and ocean governance - 
how to balance the use and the protection of the seas, WMU Journal of Maritime 
Affairs 2016, p 187-203.
30 For example in France, in particular with the National Ocean Conferences for 
Blue Growth and Climate, organized by the Ministry of Environment, Energy 
and Sea in 2015 ?http://www2.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Conference-
nationale-pour-la.html? and 2016 ?http://www2.developpement-durable.gouv.
fr/2e-conference-nationale-de-l-ocean.html?.
31 http://www.fao.org/policy-support/policy-themes/blue-growth/en/.
32 S. Lelong, V. du Castel & Y. Giron, La croissance bleue. Puissances publiques 
versus puissances privées, Diploweb.com La Revue géopolitique, mardi 19 
janvier 2016; http://www.diploweb.com/La-croissance-bleue.html.
33 N. Ros, Estrategia Blue Growth y retos de privatización del mar, in J. Cabeza 
Pereiro ?Coord.?, Estrategia Blue Growth y Derecho del Mar, Albacete Editorial 
Bomarzo 2018 ?forthcoming?.
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platforms, renewable energy equipment, aquaculture, and traditional uses 
of the sea based on mobility such as fishing34; this highlights the need to 
manage maritime areas, in order to conciliate the different activities or at 
least to ensure their efficient and sustainable management. In this 
perspective, Maritime Spatial Planning ?MSP? may be required to reduce 
conflicts between sectors and even create synergies between activities, but 
also to encourage private investment by creating predictabil i ty, 
transparency and clearer rules35.
 Most of fixed maritime industries -marine renewable and offshore 
energies but also deep-sea mining or even aquaculture- need vast marine 
areas free from any other activities and especially from fishing; they claim 
for exclusivity in the use they make of the sea. Although the Blue 
Economy claims for multiple use of space, fixed activities suppose in 
practice that the coastal State grants private concession over the public 
domain. The legal regime is still under construction; in some cases 
cohabitation appears to be possible, although it is generally not organized 
by law, but most of the time industries claim for the exclusion of other 
activities, especially fishing. Legally, private actors receive exclusive rights 
over a part of the national maritime space, exclusivity meaning exclusion 
and de facto appropriation. But sometimes, the privatization is more 
implicit, justified by the need to protect the environment, via the 
development of MPAs.
2? Development of MPAs
 Marine protected areas ?MPAs? are promoted as a spatial management 
tool ?a?; per se they are not a form of privatization but they can also be 
considered differently, in particular due to the current evolution towards 
34 J. M. Sobrino Heredia, La difícil coexistencia entre las actividades pesqueras y 
la industria minera y petrolera, in J. Cabeza Pereiro ?Coord.?, Estrategia Blue 
Growth y Derecho del Mar, Albacete Editorial Bomarzo 2018 ?forthcoming?.
35 F. Douvere & Ch. N. Ehler, New perspectives on sea use management: Initial 
findings from European experience with marine spatial planning, Journal of 
Environmental Management 2009, 90, p 77-88; L. Juda, The European Union and 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive: Continuing the Development of 
European Ocean Use Management, Ocean Development & International Law 
2010, p 34-54; F. Maes, The international legal framework for marine spatial 
planning, Marine Policy 2008, 32, p 797-810.
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the financialization of ecosystem services ?b?.
a? As a spatial management tool
 Last years, States have committed, in various fora, to create marine 
protected areas; MPAs are presented as the only way or at least the best 
solution to face the challenges of the governance of oceans and seas, from 
marine pollution to protection of biodiversity, from climate change to 
acidification. But they are also used for the integrated management of 
marine ecosystems and maritime areas. 
 This public commitment is supported, encouraged and even raised by 
private actors, first of all environmental NGOs; obviously MPAs are a well-
known tool especially for biodiversity protection, but it is essential to be 
aware of the collusion between some of the most powerful among these 
organizations, supposed to be representative of the civil society, and the 
industrial lobbies via the Charitable Trusts and Foundations which funded 
them. The relation is ambiguous, because the growing financial reliance of 
some of these NGOs, coupled with the composition of the boards of the 
Trusts and Foundations, generates a form of interdependence, as some 
environmental NGOs are effectively greatly dependent, from the oil and 
gas sector and the high-technology industries based on rare earths36; some 
even act as the armed arm of the related Charitable Trust ?Pew37?. In this 
36 On the ambiguities of this kind of relationship in the field of the governance of 
oceans and seas, and especially on the financial aspects, such as tax benefits and 
funding opacity, cf. Y. Giron & A. Le Sann, Blue Charity Business ? la réforme 
des pêches européennes ? premier panorama ? 2000 à 2011, Pêche et 
développement 2012, http://www.peche-dev.org/IMG/pdf/121107_blue_
charity_business_full_report_fr.pdf; as well as the documents presented during 
the Conference of Yan Giron, Vers une privatisation des océans ?, Lorient 
Maison de la mer, 8 December 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
MoxzcNyvSQk. For a more global analysis of collusions between Environmental 
NGOs and private funding, R. Falkner, Private environmental governance and 
international relations: exploring the links, Global environmental politics 2003, 3 
?2?, p 72-87.
37 The case of Pew is emblematic of the financial and human links between The 
Pew Charitable Trust and its environmental component Pew Environment 
Group, a major actor in the promotion of large MPAs; for the record, the Pew 
family, particularly influential in the United States and American politics, made 
its fortune in oil exploitation ?Sun Oil Company - SUNOCO?.
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context, it is important to note that most of these environmental NGOs 
claim for MPAs focused on fishing activities, the so-called no-take MPAs, 
when the other uses of the sea are not usually concerned by the ban and 
are sometimes even explicitly allowed, as it is the case of the oil and 
mining exploitation, authorized by The Nature Conservancy, the managing 
NGO for Seychelles no-take MPAs38, well known for its links with industry 
and finance...
 But the privatization dynamic can go further, with the current 
evolution towards the financialization of ecosystem services.
b? Towards the financialization of ecosystem services
 Indeed, some MPAs are now directly managed by private actors; this 
option supposes the creation of trust funds in order to assume the financial 
obligations, as regards implementation, control and surveillance, but 
sometimes also in order to compensate the ban on fishing, for example to 
help former fishermen to develop new activities. These trust funds can 
receive public funding although they are managed by private actors, most 
of the time coming from the NGOs, but they also directly receive private 
funding via the Charitable Trusts39. The capital is then able to be invested 
on the financial market, in particular the ecosystem services associated 
with the MPA. In the same vein, some funding may represent a debt-
swap40, taking into consideration ecosystem services derived from the 
proclamation and delegated implementation of the MPA.
 In these new hypotheses, there is not only an appropriation of a part of 
the public domain, but also a capitalization and a financialization based on 
it. As in the case of individual transferable quotas, this form of private 
environmental governance strengthens the dominance of the neoliberal 
38 K. Storme, Seychelles : l’ONG The nature conservancy apporte l’or noir au 
pays de l’or bleu, Le Marin, Jeudi 1er mars 2018, p 4.
39 For example, the PIPA Trust , the Phoenix Is lands Protected Area 
Conservation Trust, and the PIPA Trust’s Endowment Fund ?PTEF?, in the 
Republic of Kiribati; http://www.phoenixislands.org/trust.php.
40 The best-known example is the Seychelles, with the Seychelles’ Conservation 
& Climate Adaptation Trust ?SeyCCAT? negotiated by The Nature Conservancy 
in exchange for the commitment of the Government to create 400000 km2 of 
MPAs by 2021; cf. Seychelles Swapping Debt to Save Oceans, https://www.
nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/africa/wherewework/seychelles.xml. 
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approach, as it is not only market-oriented but above all mainly favorable to 
the large firms and capitalistic interests41.
  This privatization of the public domain, national or international, is one 
of the main current aspects of the governance of oceans and seas, but it is 
realized in a very discreet way, hidden by its opportune legitimization, as a 
biodiversity protection challenge.
II – A biodiversity protection challenge
 The claim for a better preservation of marine biodiversity is fully 
justified42, and the international agenda shows that awareness raising is 
growing not only in the civil society and NGOs but also within States and 
intergovernmental organizations. Obviously most of the initiatives 
implemented, both under national jurisdiction ?A? and on the high seas ?B?, 
are really dedicated to biodiversity protection, but environmental concern 
may also be instrumentalized in order to serve other purposes.
A – Under national jurisdiction
 The Chagos Archipelago case ?1? is the best-known example of such an 
instrumentalization; adopting a realistic approach, the spreading of large MPAs 
?2? must therefore be apprehended critically, taking into consideration their 
political and economic motivations and implications.
1? The Chagos Archipelago case
 The Chagos MPA is a case study, in order to understand how the 
environmental governance can be instrumentalized in order to serve as an 
excuse, between conservationist myth ?a? and geopolitical reality ?b?.
41 R. Falkner, Private environmental governance and international relations: 
exploring the links, Global environmental politics 2003, 3 ?2?, p 83-84.
42 Cf. J-P. Beurier, La protection juridique de la biodiversité marine, in Pour un 
droit commun de l’environnement : mélanges en l’honneur de Michel Prieur, 
Paris Dalloz 2007, p 803-815; M. C. Ribeiro, A protecção da biodiversidade 
marinha: importancia do poder do Estado na prossecução deste “interesse 
geral”, in J. Jorge Urbina & M. T. Ponte Iglesias ?Coord.?, Protección de 
intereses colectivos en el Derecho del Mar y cooperación internacional, Madrid 
Iustel 2012, p 25-62.
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a? Between conservationist myth
 The facts are relatively well-known43; on 1 April 2010, the United 
Kingdom proclaimed a decision by which it established a large no-take 
marine protected area around the Chagos Archipelago, corresponding to 
the whole EEZ44. These islands are located in the north of the Indian 
Ocean; they were detached from Mauritius by UK before the independence, 
in 1965, and were administrated as the British Indian Ocean Territory 
?BIOT? because it was a condition in order for one of the atolls, Diego 
Garcia, to become a United States military base. 
 It is also well-known that the project was initiated in 2009 by the 
Chagos Environment Network ?CEN?, a collaboration of nine conservation 
and scientific organizations leaded by the Pew Environment Group, the 
armed arm of the Pew Foundation, one of the most powerful Charitable 
Trusts and a major actor in the field of the private governance of oceans 
and seas45. This case can be analyzed as a coalition of interests and a form 
of private and public partnership, because the Chagos Environment 
Network was the leading advocate for the reserve during the consultation 
period and organized two of the major petitions in favor of the reserve 
being set up. They presented the Chagos as one of the last pristine marine 
environment biodiversity, obviously without consideration to the pollution 
of the Diego Garcia Lagoon by US Navy. Following the overwhelming 
result of this popular consultation ?90%?, the total area of the Chagos’ 
Exclusive Economic Zone was declared a fully no-take area, with the 
exception of a 3-mile zone around the island of Diego Garcia, on the last 
day before the dissolution of the Parliament. Although the official 
proclamation mentions the implication for fishing and other activities, the 
qualification as a no-take MPA has to be understood by reference to 
fisheries. But this is part of the geopolitical reality of the case.
43 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award, 18 March 2015, Chagos Marine 
Protected Area Arbitration ?Mauritius v. United Kingdom?; http://www.pca-cpa.
org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1429.
44 Proclamation N? 1 of 2010; https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&s
rcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnx0aGVjaGFnb3NhcmNoaXBlbGFnb2ZhY3RzfG
d4OjZhNTZjY2MxODAwNDAxZmY.
45 The CEN was constituted in the framework of Pew’s Global Ocean Legacy 
Project, then replaced by the Pew Bertarelli Ocean Legacy; http://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/archived-projects/global-ocean-legacy.
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b? And geopolitical reality
 A realistic approach throws light on the real motivations behind the 
creation of this MPA, one of the largest in the world. 
 Indeed, the proclamation of the Chagos MPA was not only an 
important contribution to the UK’s international conservation commitments, 
but above all a legal instrument to neutralize and even paralyze the right of 
abode of native populations deported in the 70s, depriving the Chagossians 
of their economic livelihood46, as was revealed by a WikiLeaks cable47; 
more generally it was also a way for the UK to mitigate its undertaking to 
return the islands to Mauritius when defense purposes disappeared and to 
assert its territorial jurisdiction on the BIOT in the perspective of the 
renewal of the concession of the Diego Garcia base48. In this context, the 
partnership with private organizations funded by US Charitable Trusts, 
such as Pew49, known as a close fellow traveler of the US governments, 
cannot be a coincidence...
 If biodiversity protection is a legitimate cause, this cannot be the case 
when it is detrimental to human beings. This is also true, more generally, 
when the spreading of large MPAs is used as a pretext.
46 E. M. De Santo, P. J. S. Jones & A. M. M. Miller, Fortress conservation at sea: 
a commentary on the Chagos MPA, Marine Pol icy 2011 , p 258 -260 ; N. 
Monebhurrun, Creating Marine Protected Areas to assert territorial jurisdiction 
against the Right of Abode of Native Populations: The Case of the Chagos 
Archipelago, in C. Cinelli & E. M. Vásquez Gómez ?Ed.?, Regional Strategies to 
Maritime Security: a Comparative Perspective, MARSAFENET, Valencia Tirant 
lo Blanch 2014, p 79-99; P. Sand, The Chagos Archipelago - Footprint of Empire, 
or World Heritage?, Environmental Policy and Law 2010, p 232-242; P. Sand, The 
Chagos Archipelago Cases: Nature Conservation Between Human Rights and 
Power Politics, The Global Community Yearbook of International Law & 
Jurisprudence 2013, p 125-150.
47 HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE COVERING THE 
CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO ?BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY?, Date: 
2009 May 15, 07:00 ?Friday?, Canonical ID: 09LONDON1156_a; https://
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09LONDON1156_a.html.
48 The US military base of Diego Garcia had been granted to the United States in 
1966 for a period of 50 years, subject to an extension of 20 years, and the 
territory could therefore have been returned in 2016; on 16 November 2016, the 
concession was finally renewed and should last until 30 December 2036.
49 The role played by The Pew Charitable Trust in the Chagos case is well 
known, and has been explicitly confirmed by the WikiLeaks document.
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2? The spreading of large MPAs
 The development of large marine protected areas, a fortiori according to 
a network approach, can be considered a commitment of the international 
community, including in the form of quantified objectives, taken by States, 
individually or collectively, to protect large superficies of the maritime zones 
under their national jurisdiction or even of the world ocean. But the 
proclamation of large MPAs ?a? is only a first step, and the implementation of 
large MPAs ?b? appears to be a very critical issue, especially but not 
exclusively for developing States.
a? The proclamation of large MPAs
 The establishment of large MPAs must be understood in this context, 
as some proclamations can also be seen as an easy way to fulfil the political 
commitment50 of the States concerned. Indeed large MPAs are defined by 
Environmental NGOs, by reference to a surface of more than 100 000 km2, 
considering that such a big size is the best option in order to effectively 
protect marine biodiversity. But this conservationist postulate is very 
controversial and scientific evidence and feedbacks are not sufficient at the 
time being.
 Since 2004 , the year when the Biodiversi ty beyond National 
Jurisdiction Process ?BBNJ? was launched, there has been a multiplication 
but also an extension of the surface of MPAs, especially no-take, in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans51.
 In all cases, the initiative comes from or is strongly supported by 
private actors, especially NGOs; and the creation of large MPAs can be 
50 F. Féral & B. Salvat ?Dir.?, Gouvernance, enjeux et mondialisation des 
grandes aires marines protégées, Paris L’Harmattan 2014; F. Féral, L’extension 
récente de la taille des aires marines protégées : une progression des surfaces 
inversement proportionnelle à leur normativité, VertigO - la revue électronique 
en sciences de l’environnement, Hors-série 9, juillet 2011, https://vertigo.
revues.org/10998; P. Leenhardt, B. Cazalet, B. Salvat, J. Claudet & F. Féral, The 
rise of large-scale marine protected areas: Conservation or geopolitics?, Ocean & 
Coastal Management 2013, p 112-118.
51 B. Cazalet & P. Leenhart, Le phénomène mondial de multiplication et d’
extension des surfaces des grandes aires protégées, in F. Féral & B. Salvat 
?Dir.?, Gouvernance, enjeux et mondialisation des grandes aires marines 
protégées, Paris L’Harmattan 2014, p 25-52.
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considered a public-private partnership. But without going into details, it is 
in fact possible to distinguish different hypotheses: when MPAs are 
created in the EEZ of strong coastal States and maritime Powers such as 
United States, United Kingdom or France; or when they are proclaimed in 
the EEZ of small Island developing States ?Cook Islands, Kiribati, Palau?; 
obviously with intermediary situations ?Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Chili or Ecuador?.
 In the first case, the creation of the MPAs can be the result of a 
convergence of interests, in the sense that environmental lobbying 
encounters the geopolitical needs of the coastal State, as shown by the 
Chagos case; more generally it is a good way for the United States in order 
to assert their presence and control in strategic regions, or for France in its 
Pacific territories. In the case of small island States, the balance of powers 
between public and private actors is obviously different, and the creation of 
the MPAs serves other kind of interests, some of which are environmental, 
but other economic ?by reference to fishing activities, especially tuna 
fisheries, but also to deep-sea mining or offshore operations? and 
geopolitical ?all of these MPAs are strategically located?52.
 This second degree analysis is confirmed by the implementation of 
large MPAs.
b? The implementation of large MPAs
 All the coastal States are confronted to difficulties of implementation in 
the case of large MPAs; but the problems are especially acute in small 
island States EEZ. Indeed, taking into consideration the need to manage 
the MPA but also to compensate the loss of income from fishing, the most 
frequent solution is the creation of a trust fund, such as the Chagos 
Conservation Trust53 funded by Charitable Trusts, what constitutes a well-
52 Y. Giron, The other side of large-scale, no-take, marine protected areas in the 
Pacific Ocean, in E. Fache & S. Pauwels ?Eds.?, Fisheries in the Pacific The 
Challenges of Governance and Sustainability, Pacific-Credo Publications 2016, p 
77-117.
53 In fact, there are two trusts, the Chagos Conservation Trust - CCT ?https://
chagos-trust.org/? and the Chagos Conservation Trust US ?http://cctus.org/? 
with the mission to extend the goals of Chagos Conservation Trust ?UK? to the 
United States.
28 Waseda Bulletin of Comparative Law Vol. 37
known example of private governance shifting to a form of privatization, 
furthermore in the case of a financialization of the ecosystem services 
provided by the MPA. But management options can also take the form of a 
public partnership, as exampled by the Micronesia Challenge54 and the 
Compacts of Free Association55 between the United States and Palau, 
Federated States of Micronesia, and Marshall Islands; on the one side, a 
trust fund to supplement the loss of revenue from fishing permits, and on 
the other side, the delegation given to the US to exercise the defense and 
surveillance of the maritime areas...
 The surveillance is a key question, because such large MPAs would be 
very difficult and quite impossible to monitor and control effectively, 
especially using traditional means, such as navy56. This raised the issue of 
satellite monitoring, such as Automatic Identification System ?AIS?, Vessel 
Monitoring System ?VMS?, Long-Range Identification Tracking ?LRIT?, 
and possible misuses for espionage purposes... The geopolitical dimension 
of such activities involving great powers are obvious, especially in the 
Pacific, but private actors may also be invested with satellite surveillance 
missions, as shown by Pew’s Project Eyes on the Seas57, what raised 
different but real problems.
 All these challenges are even more significant on the high seas.
B – On the high seas
 The issue of high seas MPAs ?1? appears to be at the heart of the topic, 
54 Launched in 2006 , the Micronesia Challenge is a commitment by the 
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the 
Republic of Palau, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas 
Islands, with the overall goal to effectively conserve at least 30% of the near-
shore marine resources ?and 20% of the terrestrial resources? by 2020; http://
themicronesiachallenge.blogspot.fr/.
55 The first generation of agreements dated from 1986, but new agreements were 
concluded, in 2003 with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands, and in 2010 with Palau; https://guides.library.manoa.
hawaii.edu/c.php?g=105631&p=686651.
56 O. Delfour-Samama & C. Leboeuf, Review of Potential Legal Frameworks for 
Effective Implementation and Enforcement of Marine Protection Areas in the 
High Seas, ICES Journal of Marine Science 2014, p 1031-1039.
57 http://www.pewtrusts.org/fr/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/03/
project-eyes-on-the-seas.
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especially in the framework of the current negotiation ?2? dedicated to 
biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.
1? High seas MPAs
 For two decades, high seas MPAs are presented as the fit for all 
solution in international forums ?b? but under International Law ?a? they 
remain very exceptional.
a? Under International Law
 Pursuant to International Law, high seas MPAs have no direct and 
global legal basis, but could be obviously conciliated with the freedom of 
the seas if the States so decide. Currently, only two legal systems, both 
regional, expressly provide such a legal basis for the creation of MPAs 
totally or partially including high seas. The first is the Mediterranean 
regional sea system, the so-called Barcelona System, in the framework of 
the 1995 Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological 
Diversity in the Mediterranean, in the form of SPAMIs ?Specially Protected 
Areas of Mediterranean Importance?58; as of today only one high seas 
SPAMI exists, the Pelagos Sanctuary established in 199959. The second 
58 Article 9 of the 1995 Protocol expressly allows for the establishment of 
SPAMIs in “zones partly or wholly on the high seas” ?alinea b?. Cf. N. Ros, 
Environmental Protection of the Mediterranean Sea, Revista de Estudios 
Jurídicos n? 11/2011, p 95-127, specifically p 113-117; T. Scovazzi, Le protocole 
méditerranée sur les aires spécialement protégées, Annuaire de Droit Maritime 
et Océanique 2003, Tome XXI, p 347-354, in particular p 350-354; H. Slim, Les 
aires spécialement protégées en Méditerranée, Revue de l’INDEMER 2003, n? 
6, Les zones maritimes en Méditerranée, p 121-139, especially p 129 to 133 and 
137 to 139.
59 The Sanctuary is dedicated to the protection of marine mammals; it was 
created by a tripartite agreement between France, Italy and Monaco, but its 
implementation has always been difficult and complex. Cf. M. Le Hardy, La 
protection des mammifères marins en Méditerranée. L’Accord créant le 
sanctuaire corso-liguro-provencal, in G. Cataldi ?Dir.?, La Méditerranée et le 
droit de la mer à l’aube du 21e siècle / The Mediterranean and the Law of the 
Sea at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Bruxelles Bruylant 2002, p 241-268; C. 
Cinelli, Jurisdiction and Control of the Tyrrhenian Waters on the Pelagos 
Sanctuary, in G. Andreone ?Ed.?, Jurisdiction and control at sea. Some 
environmental and security issues, MARSAFENET, Giannini Editore 2014, p 91-
112.
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regional system is the Antarctic regime as stated by the 1980 Convention 
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources ?CCAMLR?60, 
with the South Orkney Islands MPA created in 200961, and the Ross Sea 
MPA, the world’s largest MPA, in 201662. 
 The very limited success of high seas MPAs, where they are legally 
endorsed63, reflects the lack of political will of States, although they are 
communicating for their spreading in international forums.
b? In international forums
 In international organizations and conferences, public and private, 
MPAs are presented as the fit for all solution in order to solve all the 
problems the oceans and seas have to face64... The trend began at the dawn 
of the Millennium, at the initiative and with the support, ideological but 
60 This is possible under the Convention and more specif ical ly under 
Conservat ion Measure 91 -04 ?CM 91 -04?, General f ramework for the 
establishment of CCAMLR Marine Protected Areas, adopted in 2011 in 
accordance with Article IX of the Convention to provide a framework for the 
establishment of CCAMLR MPAs.
61 The discussions lasted quite a decade before the South Orkney Islands 
southern shelf MPA, the first high seas MPA established in the framework of 
CCAMLR, could be adopted in 2009.
62 It is only on 28 October 2016, that a MPA in the Ross Sea has been finally 
established, whereas previous attempts were vetoed for five years, by China and 
then Russia. Cf. K. N. Scott, Protecting the Last Ocean: the Proposed Ross Sea 
MPA. Prospects and Progress, in G. Andreone ?Ed.?, Jurisdiction and Control at 
Sea. Some environmental and security issues, MARSAFENET, Giannini Editore 
2014, p 79-90.
63 There is no other high seas MPA than Pelagos in the Mediterranean, and 
MPA proposals for the East of the White Continent and the Weddell Sea face 
very strong oppositions.
64 Among the very abundant legal literature relating to the governance of the 
high seas and the legal regime of its biodiversity, cf. P. Drankier, Marine 
Protected Areas in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, The International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 2012 , p 291 -350 ; R. Rayfuse & R. M. Warner, 
Securing a sustainable future for the oceans beyond national jurisdiction: the 
legal basis for an integrated cross-sectoral regime for high seas governance for 
the 21st century, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 2008, p 
399-421; T. Scovazzi, Negotiating Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biological Diversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Prospects and 
Challenges, The Italian Yearbook of International Law 2015, p 61-93.
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also logistic, of the private actors involved in private environmental 
governance, NGOs, Charitable Trusts, Foundations, and Alliances as the 
well-known High Seas Alliance65.
 This political claim clearly appears a public-private partnership as it 
has progressively gained importance in intergovernmental forums, at the 
regional level, for example in the framework of the OSPAR Convention, 
where there is no legal basis but a manifest political will, concretized by 
the declarative proclamation of a network of high seas MPAs66, and at the 
international level, first of all in the United Nations, and especially in the 
framework of the current negotiation.
2? In the framework of the current negotiation
 Indeed, MPAs are at the center of the issues in discussion, since the 
beginning of the debates in 2004, with the Ad hoc working group on BBNJ 
?biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction? and the Prep Com, till the 
resolution of 24 December 2017, deciding to convene an intergovernmental 
conference, under the auspices of the UN, to elaborate the text of an 
international legally binding instrument under the UNCLOS on the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction67... High seas MPAs are part of the set of 
issues identified in 2008 and considered as a package in 2011, including 
marine genetic resources ?MGRs?, area-based management tools 
?ABMTs?, environmental impact assessments ?EIAs?, and capacity 
building and technology transfer ?CB&TT?.
 In the global framework of the negotiation68, MPAs are a strong claim 
65 http://highseasalliance.org/.
66 https://www.ospar.org/work-areas/bdc/marine-protected-areas/mpas-in-
areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction; E. J. Molenaar & A. G. Oude Elferink, Marine 
protected areas in areas beyond national jurisdiction The pioneering efforts 
under the OSPAR Convention, Utrecht Law Review 2009, Volume 5, Issue 1 
?June?, p 5-20.
67 A/RES/72/249, International legally binding instrument under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction ?adopted 
without a vote?; http://undocs.org/en/a/res/72/249.
68 Cf. J-P. Pancracio, La protection de la biodiversité au-delà des zones sous 
juridiction nationale, Annuaire français de droit international 2016, p 541-563; D. 
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and appear a crucial interest for most of the developed States, but above all 
for the private actors who have made very strong lobbying in support of 
the whole negotiation process in order to obtain the revision of the legal 
regime of the high seas, erroneously presented as an area where no legal 
rules applied and cited as a new example of The Tragedy of the Commons.
 As such MPAs are presented as the most efficient of the area-based 
management tools ?a?, but geopolitical and economic issues ?b? are also at 
stake that are not so clearly explained and discussed.
a? Area-based management tools
 Although the formula includes other instruments such as Marine 
Spatial Planning, the official reference is to “area-based management tools, 
including marine protected areas”. It is a crucial issue for the future of the 
legally binding instrument; the main problems to solve will be related to 
the definition of MPA, the objectives, the relationship with/to other 
instruments and frameworks, both regional and sectoral, the process of 
identification and designation, implementation, monitoring and review, but 
also institutional mechanisms and general principles.
 High seas MPAs can represent an important obstacle for some States, 
particularly attached to the freedom of the seas, but they are also very 
interrelated with other issues such as MGRs and EIAs.
 In fact, by some aspects, and in relation with the strong involvement of 
private actors, MPAs appear to be less a tool of environmental governance 
than a mix of geopolitical and economic issues.
b? Geopolitical and economic issues
 Non-environmental aspects of high seas MPAs have to be considered 
and analyzed in the framework of the current global shift from our 
traditional State-centric public organization to a transnational system.
 Current MPAs challenges cannot be understood without any reference 
to the global debate on BBNJ, especially MGRs because very strong 
economic interests are at stake69. But one other important issue is related 
Tladi, The Common Heritage of Mankind and the Proposed Treaty on 
Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: The Choice between 
Pragmatism and Sustainability, Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
2015, p 113-132.
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to the definition and objectives of MPAs; the link with fisheries is one 
more time at the very heart of the debate70, because no-take MPAs are 
generally fishing-oriented with a total ban on fishery activities, but most of 
the time the official document appears to be silent about other uses of the 
sea. Some activities, developed in the framework of the Blue Economy, are 
fixed activities needing a physical occupation of the sea and preferring not 
to be confronted to competitive uses such as fishing. One can imagine a 
no-take MPA, allowing offshore operations, and deep-sea mining, in a 
particularly secured way, both in the Area and on the extended continental 
shelf of a coastal State71...
 Who will identify, design, manage, monitor and... finance the future 
high seas MPAs? What will be the explicit objectives and the implicit 
motivations behind the spreading of these area-based management tools? 
Where will they be created and who will benefit from this new regime of 
the high seas?
 Taking into consideration the difficulties of the negotiation and the 
lack of success or effectivity, both in coastal areas and on the high seas 
69 T. Scovazzi, The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind and the Genetic 
Resources of the Seabed beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Agenda 
Internacional 2007, Año XIV, N? 25, p 11-24; T. Scovazzi, The Exploitation of 
Marine Genetic Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, in G. 
Andreone ?Ed.?, Jurisdiction and Control at Sea. Some environmental and 
security issues, MARSAFENET, Giannini Editore 2014, p 37-54, or S. Doumbé-
Billé & J-M. Thouvenin ?Dir.?, Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Habib 
Slim, Ombres et lumières du droit international, Paris Pedone 2016, p 175-190; 
Y. Tanaka, Reflections on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Genetic 
Resources in the Deep Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 
Ocean Development and International Law 2008, p 129-149.
70 Y. Giron, The other side of large-scale, no-take, marine protected areas in the 
Pacific Ocean, in E. Fache & S. Pauwels ?Eds.?, Fisheries in the Pacific The 
Challenges of Governance and Sustainability, Pacific-Credo Publications 2016, p 
77-117.
71 Indeed, the exploitation of deep-seabed mineral resources has not yet started 
in the Area, but the strategic race for rare earths has already begun on the 
continental shelf of coastal States, in the Pacific, and especially on the 
continental shelf of Papua New Guinea where the Canadian group Nautilus 
Minerals has obtained a 20-year license in the framework of the Solwara 1 
Project, and is about to extend its activities on the continental shelf of Fiji, 
Tonga, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Zealand.
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when MPAs have a legal basis, one can wonder what interests are really at 
stake?
 It is all the more evident that many of these MPAs will be managed in 
the framework under construction, as part of the current private 
environmental governance system, although high seas are legally a public 
space in the sense that Article 89 of UNCLOS states “no State may validly 
purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty ”. But is it really 
a better solution to permit private appropriation? If private governance is 
supposed to be more efficient because it is market-oriented, State-centered 
or public governance offers guaranties inherent to a democratic system; 
indeed the State-system is based on sovereign equality and governments 
are elected and politically responsible, but NGOs are only supposed to be 
representative of the civil society, and the members of their board, as in 
the case of Trusts, Foundations and Corporations, are designated and 
represent the private actors system...
*
*     *
 From governance to privatization, Modern Law of the Sea appears to 
be at a crossroads, between International and Transnational Law... 
Obviously this trend is correlative to more global changes of the 
international system, and correspond to a real shift in our society; it is 
possibly too late to stop it, but if we are aware of what is going to happen 
maybe we could mitigate its effects to prevent the emergence of a less 
human world.
